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Abstract
BACKGROUND
The Great Recession had a strong effect not only on the economy of developed
countries but also on family dynamics. Many studies investigate how the crisis affected
fertility behavior, but the link between economic shocks and childbearing is still
debated.
OBJECTIVE
Most studies argue that fertility responds to recessions with only a temporary
postponement of first births by young women. A paper by Comolli and Bernardi
(2015), though, finds a permanent positive effect of the Great Recession in the United
States on childlessness among women in their late thirties. In light of these results, we
test whether a similar effect is found in a different context, i.e., Italy.
METHODS
We apply the difference-in-difference method to synthetic cohorts of Italian childless
women in their late thirties to assess whether the crisis had a permanent impact on the
cohorts’ childlessness rates. We use the Istat 2004–2013 Italian Labor Force Survey
(LFS).
RESULTS
During the Great Recession in Italy, contrary to the United States, childlessness among
women around the age of 40 registered short-term negative fluctuations. Only mid-
educated women seem to have slightly postponed first births during the crisis.
CONTRIBUTION
This paper contributes to the debate on how economic shocks affect fertility, with the
objective of assessing whether the recent Great Recession had a permanent effect on
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childlessness in Italy. The main conclusion is that, except for the group of women with
average education, the crisis did not increase permanent childlessness among Italian
women beyond its preexisting positive long-term trend.
1. Introduction
Permanent childlessness in Europe is on the rise, not only in northern and continental
European countries but also in southern – and more traditional – countries like Italy,
where an increasing number of women are forgoing motherhood (Gonzáles and Jurado-
Guerrero 2006; Miettinen et al. 2015; Mills et al. 2015; Sobotka 2017).
Childlessness among Italian women at the age of 45 increased from about 12% for
the birth cohort of 1950 to almost 25% for the birth cohort of 1980 (authors’ estimates
on the Human Fertility Database, Eurostat, and Istat data). Notwithstanding this very
rapid diffusion of permanent childlessness, research on this topic is relatively rare in
Italy where, until recently, it appeared to be due only to celibacy or biological sterility
(Tanturri and Mencarini 2008). However, investigating the determinants of
childlessness in Italy is crucial because the postponement of first births reduces
completed fertility in a society that already faces the challenge of a rapidly aging
population and an increasing dependency ratio, dramatically driven up by this long-term
decline in births (Billari and Kohler 2004; Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; Mynarska et
al. 2015; Sobotka 2004).
The diversification of living arrangements and of the life-course, and the
weakening of the social norm of parenthood might be responsible both for the decline in
family size and for the diffusion of childlessness. Other structural conditions
incentivizing postponement are the increase in the direct and indirect costs of
childbearing (especially for women), the lack of adequate family policies and childcare
facilities, and the gender-unequal division of domestic tasks within the couple. Finally,
yet importantly, employment insecurity and financial uncertainty have been proved to
delay family formation. The severe recession that has hit advanced economies since the
summer of 2007 had a significant effect not only on the economic system but also on
family dynamics and family formation. In particular, the preexisting long-term
declining trend in marriage rates has accelerated since 2008, and the increase in fertility
registered during the 2000s has abruptly halted, and in some cases even reverted. These
trends are common to most countries in Europe and the United States.
During the first phase of the Great Recession, Italy, has been in an economic dip
for a longer period compared to other countries, and the negative growth registered in
the GDP has also been stronger. In the second phase, when the financial crisis turned
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into a European sovereign debt crisis, Italy again entered into recession in the third
quarter of 2011 and continued to experience significantly negative economic growth for
the whole of 2013 (OECD 2017). The crisis generated tremendous consequences, in
particular for the Italian labor market: Between 2008 and 2013, almost a million jobs
were lost, and the unemployment rate went from 6.8% to 12.2% (Eurostat 2017; Istat
2017). 4  Also,  after  the  peak  of  the  crisis,  the  growth  of  the  Italian  economy  has
remained feeble at most, lower than all other major European states. Only in 2016 has
the GDP again reached the level of the year 2000, but it is still far from its historical
maximum (Istat 2017).
Many studies address the issue of how the business cycles affect fertility behavior
(e.g., Adserà 2004, 2011; Currie and Schwandt 2014; Del Bono, Weber, and Winter-
Ebmer 2015; Fokkema et al. 2008; Inanc 2015; Kreyenfeld and Andersson 2014; Meron
and Widmer 2002; Morgan, Cumberworth, and Wimer 2011; Sobotka, Skirbekk, and
Philipov 2010, 2011), and most of the findings indicate that fertility slows down during
recession and accelerates during economic booms. During economic downturns,
individuals delay family commitments such as marriage and childbearing. Many of
these studies document the postponement of childbearing during periods of economic
recession, especially for couples at low parities (first births) and among younger women
(Goldstein et al. 2013; Schneider 2015). Postponement is usually only temporary and,
as soon as the economy recovers, couples recuperate marriages and births, at least in
part. The literature is rich, but few studies address the permanent demographic effects
of the crisis, and even fewer consider the consequences of economic crises specifically
for childlessness rates (Comolli and Bernardi 2015). Although most of the existing
literature shows that the recession has no impact on childbearing at older ages
(Goldstein et al. 2013; Schneider 2015), other results for the United States show instead
a slight increase in permanent childlessness due to the Great Recession (Comolli and
Bernardi 2015).
The present paper aims at filling these gaps in the literature (a) by testing the
existence of a link between the recent economic dip and childlessness rates in Italy and
(b) by investigating whether the Great Recession had a permanent effect on fertility in
terms of forgone (first) births. To do so, we focus on a specific group of Italian women,
namely childless women in their late thirties who spent the last years of their
reproductive lives during the Great Recession and, during this extremely uncertain
period, had to decide whether to have their first child or postpone childbearing
(McDonald et al. 2011). For this particular group of women, clearly, the chances of
successfully postponing childbearing are lower because they are approaching the limit
of their biological ability to conceive. We argue therefore that, should these women
4 The unemployment rate was particularly high among young adults: 23% among those 15–34 years old and
40% among those 15–24 years old (Eurostat 2017; Istat 2017).
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postpone motherhood due to the crisis, few of them would be able to recuperate births
after the recession, and thus most of these postponed births would be lost.
On the one hand, we might think that there are no reasons that the uncertainty
generated by the Great Recession would have a different effect on the childbearing
decisions of older women compared to the decisions of younger women. We might
argue that economic insecurity has different effects on the reproductive decisions of
childless women compared to mothers, or of women with different educational levels,
or of women who belong to different social classes. We might think that there is no
difference in the impact of the crisis on women in their early reproductive years
compared to women in their late thirties. However, women who are close to the age of
40 know that their chances to conceive a baby decrease every year, and they might not
be willing to take the risk of postponing motherhood due to financial and labor market
uncertainty. The results of studies in the United States (Comolli and Bernardi 2015)
confirm that a non-negligible number of white American women took that risk during
the crisis.
As will be presented later in more detail, outcomes in Italy are strongly dissimilar
to the American outcomes, which makes the comparison interesting. First, despite the
large share of women who remain without children, an increasing prevalence of
childlessness is a recent phenomenon in Italy compared to the United States. Tanturri
and Mencarini (2008: 53) point out that “a cross-country comparison of the prevalence
of childlessness points up the uniqueness of the Italian pattern and its rapid change,”
and Miettinen  et  al.  (2015)  show that  Italy,  among western  countries,  is  unique  in  the
speed of change in rates of childlessness. This increase in childlessness is also predicted
to continue in the future for women in the 1970s and 1980s cohorts (Sobotka 2017).
When studying the determinants of childlessness, Italy thus represents a particularly
interesting case.5
Second, despite registering one of the smallest number of children per woman
among western countries, one of the highest ages at first child, and a large share of
childless women (Adserà 2004; Del Boca 2002; Balbo, Billari, and Mills 2013;
Caltabiano 2016), in Italy the social norm of motherhood is still quite strong. Also,
economic circumstances may not be as powerful as the cultural and social norm of
childbearing (Micheli 2000, 2012).6
5 In addition, the design applied in our paper facilitates analyses in contexts where high quality longitudinal
data is not available. Italy is one of these cases for which it is difficult to get recent longitudinal data covering
the crisis period that is necessary to investigate childbearing behavior and its socioeconomic determinants.
6 The Italian institutional context is also different from that of the United States in terms of redistributive and
broad welfare policies. However, in terms of family policies and financial support to parents, in Italy it is also
difficult and costly to have babies. While young parents might be able to rely on extended family, the older
the parents get, the less support they might receive from grandparents.
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These are some of the reasons why we might expect to find a postponement effect
of the crisis on first births to Italian women in their early thirties, but a much smaller
effect (or none) as women get close to the age of 40, even in the presence of the
massive economic and labor market uncertainty generated by the Great Recession.
Section 2 of this paper presents the recent evidence on the effects of economic
crises on fertility. Section 3 illustrates the recent trends in fertility and childlessness in
the Italian context and presents the research questions of the paper. Section 4 describes
the data and the method we use in the analyses. Section 5 illustrates the results of these
analyses, and Section 6 discusses conclusions.
2. Fertility and the business cycle
A growing number of studies address the issue of how business cycles affect
childbearing behavior (Adserà 2004, 2011; Comolli and Bernardi 2015; Currie and
Schwandt 2014; Del Bono, Weber, and Winter-Ebmer 2015; Fokkema et al. 2008;
Inanc 2015; Kreyenfeld and Andersson 2014; Meron and Widmer 2002; Morgan,
Cumberworth, and Wimer 2011; Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2010, 2011). Many of
these studies document the negative effect of economic downturns on births in Europe
and in the United States, showing postponement of childbearing during economic
recessions, especially among women at younger ages (Goldstein et al. 2013) and at low
parities. The procyclical association between the business cycle and fertility is
established by looking at period trends or specific macroeconomic indicators such as
GDP, unemployment, consumer confidence, or housing market characteristics (Comolli
2017; Kreyenfeld, Andersson, and Pailhé 2012; Schneider 2015; Sobotka, Skirbekk,
and Philipov 2010, 2011).
Most of the evidence regarding Italy assesses the link between uncertainty in the
labor market and childbearing behavior. One of the main theoretical arguments driving
the postponement of childbearing during economic dips relates labor market constraints
– such as rising unemployment and declining wages – to the rise in the relative cost of
childbearing and thus to the growing incentives for childlessness. In an increasingly
uncertain social and economic context, some couples might consider a long-term
commitment to parenthood unsustainable.
Cazzola, Pasquini, and Angeli (2016) investigate the relationship between
unemployment and fertility in Italy in the period 1995–2012, focusing on the
geographical differences in this correlation. The recent increase in male and female
unemployment rates seems to be negatively linked to fertility in the northern and central
areas of Italy, but the results for the southern regions are ambiguous. The weak and
positive relationship emerging between unemployment and fertility rates in the south
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could mean that couples take advantage of periods out of the labor market to have
children. However, the authors suggest that results could have been affected by the
uncertainty in the local labor market participation data, which does not take into
account the undeclared work occurring in the black economy.7 Santarelli (2011) and
Vignoli, Drefahl, and De Santis (2012) analyze the labor force status of married couples
in Italy and their effect on childbearing. The authors find higher first birth rates for
couples with nonworking women, confirming the importance of the man’s economic
position on the decision of having a first child. González and Jurado-Guerrero (2006),
who analyze the transition to motherhood, and Baizán (2005), who analyzes second or
higher-order birth rates, find similar results.
In traditional countries like Italy, two distinct childbearing patterns can be
observed: In the first group are couples in which the traditional male breadwinner
model is in place. Women are full-time mothers (the so-called ‘stay-at-home-moms’),
do not participate in the labor market, and have children earlier. In the second group are
couples in which both partners are highly educated, have higher income, and thus can
afford to have children even though the mother is working (Testa, Cavalli, and Rosina
2014). For the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to know how much these
couples suffered from labor market and financial insecurity during the crisis and
whether they changed their childbearing behavior in response to that. However, at the
time of writing we could not find any empirical evidence linking more directly the
Great Recession to fertility behavior in Italy. In the next section, we illustrate the recent
trends and specificities of the Italian context in fertility rates and childlessness.
3. Trends in fertility and childlessness in Italy
Despite strong family attachments and the prevalence of traditional family forms,
persistently low fertility levels have long characterized Italy. After the baby boom in the
mid-1960s, the total fertility rate (TFR) steadily declined to very low levels in the mid-
1980s, reaching lowest-low fertility rates (less than 1.3 children per woman) in the
period 1993–2003 (Caltabiano 2008).8 At the end of the nineties, fertility started to
increase  again,  and  TFR  peaked  in  2010  at  1.46.  This  increase  was  due  to  the
recuperation of postponed births during the nineties (Caltabiano, Castiglioni, and
Rosina 2009; Caltabiano 2016) but also to the larger share of births among immigrant
women.
7 In 2012, the incidence of black economy activity in the southern regions was estimated to reach 20.9% of
total employment, compared with 12.1% in Italy as a whole (European Commission 2014).
8 The long-term decline in fertility in Italy during the last three decades touched its lowest point in 1995, with
a fertility rate of 1.19 children per woman.
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With the onset of the financial crisis, between 2008 and 2009, Italian births
decreased by 1.4%, and since then the decrease has further accelerated: Between 2009
and 2012, the number of births fell by 6.2%. TFR in Italy declined uninterruptedly after
2010, reaching 1.34 in 2016, back to the level of 2004 (Istat 2017). If we look at age-
specific  births  rates  in  Italy  during  the  years  of  the  crisis,  we  witness,  as  in  other
countries, that the largest fertility drop is concentrated among young women (–9% in
births for women who were younger than 25 between 2008 and 2012). For first births,
this decline is even stronger (–13.4% in births for women under 25), while births
among older women are still rising (+7.4% for those 35–39 years old, and +26.9% for
those 40+ years old between 2008 and 2012) (Istat 2017). Thus it seems that the
negative fertility response to the recession in Italy is concentrated on women who can
afford to postpone births because they are far from the biological limit of fertility (De
Rose and Strozza 2015).9
The latter figures suggest that, if the biological limits of fertility are approaching,
women do not change their reproductive behavior based on economic circumstances, in
contrast to younger women who can afford to postpone their first child. However, the
same results were found and the same conclusions were drawn for the United States,
and yet, the most recent empirical evidence has shown that there has been a negative
effect of the crisis on older women close to the end of their reproductive life (Comolli
and Bernardi 2015). In this paper, we test whether the same happened in Italy, namely if
women close to the end of their reproductive lives changed their fertility behavior,
postponing their first child due to the crisis as women in their early thirties seem to be
doing. (However, dissimilar to the younger women, the older women likely chose to
definitively renounce motherhood.)
Another important issue to consider about the Italian context is the regional
heterogeneity. Not only were the effects of the Great Recession different across regions
(with the largest negative consequences registered in the south), but even fertility rates
and the trends in the last decades are very different across the country. Traditionally,
childbearing rates have been higher in the south of Italy compared to the north, but
between the 1990s and the precrisis period, fertility rates were declining in the south
and strongly increasing in the center and north of Italy. Regional fertility rates that were
once very different converged in 2006/2007, and since then we witnessed a reversal of
the geographical trends in fertility, with permanently higher rates in the north.10
The overall level of childlessness in Italy is also made up of heterogeneous
regional trends (Caltabiano 2008). Until recently, overall fertility was higher in the
9 The same is evident for the second parity: Among mothers who declared that they were affected by the
recession, a smaller percentage of 40+ women declared that they postponed a second child.
10 Considering first births, the same geographical reversal appears: In the mid-1990s, first birth rates were
higher in the south compared to the north, while two decades later the opposite was true.
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south, but women who remained unmarried and childless were also more common in
the southern regions. In the north, overall fertility was lower, but childlessness was less
common (Tanturri and Mencarini 2008). However, the situation has recently reversed:
While the trend in childlessness in the south is more or less flat, the rate of childlessness
is increasing rapidly in the north and in central Italy. These patterns indicate that the
causes of childlessness have probably changed over time.
Another interesting and related issue is the educational gradient of fertility and
childlessness in Italy. Traditionally negative, when studied comparatively to other
countries and in an aggregate perspective (Wood, Neels, and Kil 2014), this gradient
recently showed signs of a reversal at the individual level, at least in the northern
regions (Caltabiano, Castiglioni, and Rosina 2009). There, more educated women still
tend to enter motherhood later, compared to the lower educated, but they are more
likely to recuperate births after age 30–35.
Studying paths to childlessness in Italy (and Poland), Mynarska et al. (2015)
identified the largest majority of Italian childless women (more than 40%) as working
single women. However, the second largest category of childless women is composed
of disadvantaged women who are very low educated, come from economically poor
conditions, and have been unemployed and single for much of their adult lives (more
than 20%).
The distinction between voluntary (childfree) and involuntary childlessness is not
clear-cut. Many women change their opinion over time or move back and forth from
one  position  to  the  other.  Many  women  delay  pregnancy  to  the  point  that  it  becomes
unlikely or impossible, in which case voluntary postponement is transformed into
involuntary childlessness (Rowland 1998; Mynarska et al. 2015). This dynamic
highlights the importance of the temporal dimension in this type of study and the useful
distinction between temporary and permanent childlessness (Bloom and Pebley 1982).
Tanturri and Mencarini (2008) provide an interesting portrait of voluntarily
childfree women in Italy. The lack of a stable partnership seems to be an important
cause, but so it is voluntary childlessness among couples (about one third of couples).
The latter is more common in urban environments, among women with less traditional
value orientations (less religious and choosing nonmarital living arrangements) and
with higher educational attainment. Nevertheless, Tanturri and Mencarini (2008) also
highlight the fact that voluntarily and involuntarily childless women share a common
obstacle to motherhood, namely the experience of a difficult entry into the labor market.
This might be a structural constraint to early childbearing that influences the decision
later in life to remain childless. An evaluation of the rationale behind voluntary
childlessness in Italy goes beyond the scope of this article, but an implicit contribution
of our study is that we move forward the debate on whether childlessness has structural
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socioeconomic roots beyond the cultural, physical, or circumstantial reasons to have no
children.11
4. Data and methods
As mentioned, the present paper aims at testing the existence of a link between the
recent economic dip and childlessness in Italy, investigating whether the Great
Recession had a permanent effect on fertility in terms of forgone births. The latter is
difficult to identify because, to investigate whether the total number of children these
women had is higher or lower in comparison to women not involved in the crisis,
researchers need to observe the complete fertility of women who spend part of their
reproductive years during the recession.
To solve this problem, we follow, as closely as possible, the approach by Comolli
and Bernardi (2015) who apply the method of difference-in-difference (DID) to pseudo-
cohorts of American women close to the end of their reproductive lives, to test the
existence of an effect of the Great Recession on the cohort’s childlessness rates.
Pseudo (or synthetic) panel data is pooled cross-sectional data that is collected
over time (Deaton 1985). Individuals are pooled together according to some time
invariant characteristics (such as year of birth, race, or gender) and then these similar
individuals are followed over time. Information is collected longitudinally, not from the
same individuals, but from random samples of individuals that share those particular
time-invariant characteristics. In the present case, we focus on Italian women born in
particular cohorts: Because we are interested in estimating the permanent effect of the
recession, we focus on childless women close to the end of their reproductive lives
(around 40 years old) for whom a postponement of the first child is likely to mean
forgone births.
11 Likewise, it is paramount to understand that the decision to have children or not (the ‘extensive’ margin of
fertility) is radically different from the decision of parents to have or not have another child (the ‘intensive’
margin of fertility). This is especially important in Italy, a context where the consensus in the literature is that
almost all women want to have at least one child (Goldstein et al. 2013; Castiglioni and Dalla-Zuanna 2009).
The Eurobarometer 2011 data (Testa 2014) reveal that in Italy, for 23% of women aged 25 to 39, the ideal
family size is one child only. (In Europe, the proportion is larger in only Germany and Austria.) Moreover,
the average personal ideal of family size has significantly declined over time, especially for women over 40
(those who have already experienced all the difficulties related to becoming mothers). In 2001, the ideal was
higher than 2.2, but it is lower than 2 in 2011. Another crucial issue is that the cross-country correlation
between the percentage of childless individuals and the proportion of men and women who have fewer
children than they want is positive. In countries like Italy, where most parents are unsatisfied with the number
of children they have, the childlessness rate is also higher that the European average. Thus, even if the ideal
family size in Italy is declining over time and childlessness rates are growing, most Italian women still end up
having at least one child (Caltabiano, Castiglioni, and Rosina 2009).
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The analyses are based on the 2004–2013 Italian Labor Force Survey (LFS) by
Istat.12 The number of biological resident children is retrievable from the indication of
the type of relationship with the reference person of the survey. In more detail, based on
the parental relations within the family, we identified those women who are mothers
and those who are not.13 Our dependent variable is binary: being childless or not.
The LFS is useful because, first, it has the necessary large sample size needed for a
pseudo-cohort study of childless women where we select only a restricted group of
them (175,000 individuals and 70,000 households are interviewed each quarter of the
year). Second, the LFS covers many years up to the very recent; and, third, the LFS
reports detailed demographic information that could be useful to refine the analysis and
investigate whether there are heterogeneous effects of the recession on childlessness.
Given the illustrated geographical variation in the Italian context and the educational
differentials  in  fertility  trends,  and  using  a  sample  size  that  allows  us  to  do  so,  we
complement our investigation of the effect of the recession on cohorts’ childlessness by
analyzing the differential impact across geographical divisions and women’s
educational groups.
First, based on the recession periods and the trend in the TFR in Italy, we chose the
recession and nonrecession years. The financial crisis started in the summer of 2007 in
the  United  States,  but  the  first  quarter  of  negative  growth  in  Italy  was  registered  one
year later, in the summer of 2008, and the negative GDP growth persisted until mid-
2009 (see Figure 1).14 As mentioned, after a period of illusory positive growth in 2010,
Italy entered a new recession period in 2011 that lasted until mid-2013. We argue that
these two dips are part of the same crisis that was never really interrupted, and thus we
consider the entire period 2009–2013 as a recession period. Moreover, in the period
2008–2010, the crisis in Italy had not yet produced significant effects on the labor
market, and it had not yet revealed its persistence over time. Given the lag between
macroeconomic phenomena, fertility planning, and fertility realizations, we selected
2010 as the last year of nonrecession births. We also selected 2010 because it  was the
last year of the peak of the TFR (see Figure 1). The babies born in 2010, we argue, are
the last that were planned in 2008 and conceived in 2009, at the onset of the Great
Recession.
12 See Istat (2006) for a detailed description of the survey methodology. The data has been accessed and the
analyses have been carried out by the authors at the Istat’s Laboratorio per l’Analisi dei Dati ELEmentari
(ADELE) in Florence.
13 We acknowledge that the way the childlessness variable is constructed is less that optimal, women not
being directly asked about the number of children they ever had. As shown elsewhere (Comolli and Bernardi
2015), however, the measurement error in the dependent variable should not affect our estimate of the effect
of the crisis on childlessness. Measurement error in the dependent variable affects only standard errors.
14 The quarterly GDP variation peaked in mid-2009 at –5.5% compared to the –3% of the United States
(OECD 2017).
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A final crucial reason to select 2009 as the last nonrecession year (and 2010 as last
year of nonrecession births) is technical: We can only use the data starting from 2004.15
Since we need to group women in birth cohorts of at least three years (to have a large
enough  sample  size  but  small  enough  to  include  in  each  pseudo-cohort  only  the  very
similar women) and we include three groups (treatment, control, and placebo), we could
not select any year earlier than 2010 as the last year of nonrecession births to be able to
include all the three groups.16
Figure 1: The pseudo-panel selection
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
TFR trend
Recession
T (1974–
1976) 34–36 37–39
C (1971–
1973) 34–36 37–39
P (1968–
1970) 34–36 37–39
Source: Elaboration of the authors.
We select the groups (the pseudo-panels) of women as shown in Figure 1. As the
treatment group, we select childless women who turned 34–36 years old exactly in 2010
(thus being 37–39 years old in 2013). These childless women born in 1974–1976 spent
the last years of their reproductive lives (late thirties) during the Great Recession, and
they  had  to  decide  whether  to  have  their  first  child  or  not  during  these  years.  We
compare this treatment group to another pseudo-cohort of women (control group) who
were born three years before (1971–1973) and turned the same age (34–36 in 2007 and
37–39 in 2010), just before the onset of the crisis. We argue that the only difference
between these two random groups of women is that women in the first group, the
treatment group, spend their last years of reproductive life (37–39) during the economic
turmoil (2010–2013), while the control group spends that time in a noncrisis period
(2007–2010).
15 We could not use the data before 2004 because the collection and the sampling method of the Italian Labor
Force Survey are not comparable.
16 However, as a robustness check, we replicated the analyses using 2009 and 2011 as the last nonrecession
birth years and restricted the birth cohorts to two years. We did not find any significant difference in the
results.
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We initially select the maximum age at which we measure permanent childlessness
at  39  years  old  because,  in  the  data,  we  do  not  have  information  about  how  many
children each woman has; we know only about the presence of any resident children in
the household. This means that we might be underestimating the number of children
each woman has, given that some of the children might have left the parental
household. Restricting the age at which we measure completed fertility allows us to
limit the impact of this measurement error in our dependent variable.17
However, even if the probability of conceiving is greatly reduced after the age of
39, it is still possible that women have children after that age. Also, completed fertility
is usually measured in the literature as not earlier than 44 years old. Therefore, to
ensure the robustness of our estimates, we replicate the analysis, changing the age at
which we measure permanent childlessness. Beyond looking at women 37–39, we also
investigate the probability of remaining childless for women who, at the end of the
analyzed period, are 38–40 and 42–44. Finally, we also pick a placebo group of women
who – like the control group – did not leave their last years of reproductive life during
the recession (34–39 years old in the period 2004–2007).
When we try to estimate the impact of the crisis on childlessness, the identification
is complicated by the presence of two different effects in the variation of childlessness
rates over time: the period and the cohort effects. If we only look at the difference
between  the  proportion  of  childless  women  at  44  years  old  in  2013  and  the  same
proportion of childless women at the age of 44 in 2010, we cannot differentiate the
period from the cohort effect (Eq. 1).
Δ = (YT,1|T=1 – YC,1|T=1)          (1)
However, we can use the trend over time in childlessness in the control group to
de-trend the period changes in childlessness in the treatment group, thus obtaining (at
least in close approximation) the period effect of the crisis on cohort childlessness (Eq.
2).
ΔΔ = (YT,1|T=1 – YT,0|T=0) – (YC,1|T=1 – YC,0|T=0)          (2)
Equation 3 illustrates the regression model that we use in the multivariate analyses.
Woman i’s individual-level probability of remaining childless depends on her age (the
variable ‘Post,’ which is equal to 1 for women in the age interval that we considered for
complete fertility, e.g., 37–39 in Figure 1) and her birth cohort (the variable ‘Treat,’
which is equal to 1 if she is born in the treatment birth cohort, e.g., 1974–1976 in
17 We can easily suppose that in Italy, given the late age at leaving the parental home (Eurostat 2017), only a
very small number of children have already left when mothers are aged 39.
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Figure  1),  which  jointly  determine  whether  this  woman  spends  the  last  years  of  her
reproductive life during the Great Recession. This joint probability is captured by the
coefficient β3 of the interaction term in Eq. 3 (DID=Post*Treat), namely the difference-
in-difference estimate of the period effect of the crisis on the treatment group with
respect to the control group. The analysis is replicated comparing the control and the
placebo groups of childless women and different age groups at which we measure
complete fertility (namely at 37–39, 38–40, and 42–44).
Prob(Childless)i = α + β1*Post i + β2*Treat i + β3*DID i + εi          (3)
As suggested by the description of the Italian context in Section 3, neither the
intensity of the crisis nor the fertility behavior is homogenous within the country. The
analysis is thus further replicated, adding the differentiation by geographical division of
residence (northeast, northwest, center, south, and islands)18 and women’s educational
level (primary, lower secondary, higher secondary, university diploma, and university
degree).19
We ran separate regression for each group for the ease of interpretation of the
estimates and because, conceptually, it is as if we were comparing different pseudo-
panels of women. We consider these two variables as being time-invariant
characteristics (which might be a reasonable assumption by the age of 30 or more,
given the characteristics of the Italian population) and we assume that women residing
in the north are more similar to each other compared to women living in the center or in
the south (and the same applies to primary-educated women compared to university-
educated women). The latter assumptions of time-invariance of the region of residence
and the educational level on which we base the pseudo-cohort selection, however,
should be taken a bit more cautiously compared to the same assumption about gender
and year of birth. In fact, while the latter are clearly time-invariant characteristics,
women could move from one region to another to rejoin their partner or for personal
working reasons. Also, both unobservable variables could be affected by the crisis, and
certainly could affect women’s likelihood of becoming mothers. Furthermore, even
though it is not very common in Italy, adult education exists, and we cannot rule out the
possibility that women increase their educational level between the ages of 30 and 40.
18 Northeast: Friuli Venezia-Giulia, Veneto, Trentino Alto-Adige, Emilia Romagna. Northwest: Piemonte,
Lombardia, Liguria. Center: Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio. South: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Calabria,
Basilicata, Puglia. Islands: Sicilia, Sardegna.
19 Primary: No education or primary school. Lower secondary: middle school or some high school. Upper
secondary: completed high school. University diploma: diploma from cultural institutions or Laurea Breve
(not followed by a master). University degree: bachelor degree or higher.
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However, on average we judge that these two variables are sufficiently stable in the
period considered and substantially time-invariant.20
5. Results
In this section, we present the descriptive findings on the trends in childlessness among
Italian women during the years of crisis and then the results of the difference-in-
difference regressions.
5.1 Descriptive results
Figure 2 shows the proportion of childless women in the different cohorts we selected.
The dark blue lines show the decline in childlessness between the ages of 34–36 and
37–39 in the three different cohorts: the treatment cohort of women born in 1974–1976
(the thick dark blue line on the right side), the control cohort born in 1971–1973 (the
thin dark blue line in the middle), and the placebo cohort of women born in 1968–1970
(the dotted dark blue line on the left side). To test the robustness of our results, we add
estimates for women in different age groups (lighter blue lines): between 35–37 and
38–40 (for the cohorts: 1973–1975 [T]; 1970–1972 [C]; 1967–1969 [P]) and between
39–41 and 42–44 (for the cohorts: 1969–1971 [T]; 1966–1968 [C]; 1963–1965 [P]).
First, Figure 2 shows that younger cohorts display a higher proportion of women
remaining without children in all age groups. The increase seems more pronounced
between the cohort of women born in the late sixties (the placebo groups indicated by
the dotted lines) and the cohorts born in the early seventies who completed their fertility
before  the  onset  of  the  crisis  (almost  a  +5% increase  in  childlessness  both  by  the  late
thirties and the early forties).
According to our estimates, in the youngest birth cohort included in the analysis
for whom we could observe complete fertility until the age of 44 in 2013 (women born
in 1969–1971), the proportion of permanent childlessness is about 24%. In the same
cohort of women, at the age of 40, about 26% were childless. In the birth cohort of the
mid-1970s (those born five years later), at the latest age at which we can observe
complete fertility (namely at 40 years old), the proportion of women without children is
at 28–30%.
20 For instance, we checked the robustness of our assumption by controlling in our models for whether women
migrated to another region (in the last year), and results were not affected (detailed estimates available upon
request).
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Figure 2: Childlessness proportion in selected age groups and years
Source: Elaboration of the authors based on the Italian Labor Force Survey (LFS) data 2004–2013 accessed through the Laboratorio
per l’Analisi dei Dati ELEmentari (ADELE) of Istat in Florence.
This is result diverges from the evidence reported in the United States (Comolli
and Bernardi 2015), where the incidence of childlessness was declining in younger
cohorts. In fact, even if the proportion of permanently childless women in the two
countries is now rather similar (about 23–25% at completed fertility), in Italy, contrary
to what happened in the United States, this proportion has steadily increased since the
birth cohorts of the mid 1950s (Tanturri and Mencarini 2008). Even during the first
years of the 2000s, when fertility rates were increasing and childlessness was declining
in the United States and in other European countries, in Italy (despite the recuperation
of births and the rising TFR) childlessness kept increasing.
It is useful, for the interpretation of the results in the next section, to look more
closely to these divergent long-term trends. Figure 3 compares rates of childlessness in
Italy and the United States at the age of 40–44 across cohorts of women born between
1900 and 1975. The picture clearly shows that while in the United States the increase in
childlessness had already started in the birth cohorts of the early forties, the rise in Italy
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started in much younger cohorts, born 15 to 20 years later. Furthermore, the increase in
childlessness in the United States has been quite gradual between women born in the
1940s and in the mid-1960s, and it has stabilized in the following cohorts below 20%.
In  contrast,  in  Italy,  the  share  of  childless  women  has  steeply  increased  from  10%
among women born in the late 1950s to 20% among women born a decade later. The
rate of childlessness in Italy has surpassed that of the United States among women born
in  the  1970s  (the  last  for  whom  we  can  observe  complete  fertility),  getting  close  to
25%.
Figure 3: Cohort childlessness in Italy and the United States (1900–1975) at age
40–44 (percentage of childless women)
Source: Elaboration of the authors based on Dykstra (2009) and Rowland (2007) for birth cohort until the mid-1930s for the United
States and the mid-1950s for Italy. Authors’ estimates on Istat, Eurostat, and Human Fertility Database data from the 1955 cohort for
Italy. United States Census Bureau National Vital Statistics data from the 1935 cohort for the United States.
The second interesting fact illustrated in Figure 2 is that the decline in
childlessness is steeper in the late thirties compared with the early forties, where the
biological limits of fecundity reduce the probability that women conceive and the
likelihood of remaining permanently childless is higher (McDonald et al. 2011).
Finally, in terms of the effect of the Great Recession for childlessness between
2010 and 2013, although we cannot come to definite conclusions just from this
graphical descriptive representation, there seems to be a steeper decline in the
proportion of women without children between 2010 and 2013 compared to the decline
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
19
69
–1
97
5
19
68
–1
97
2
19
66
–1
97
0
19
64
–1
96
8
19
62
–1
96
6
19
60
–1
96
4
19
58
–1
96
2
19
56
–1
96
0
19
54
–1
95
8
19
51
–1
95
5
19
50
–1
95
4
19
48
–1
95
2
19
46
–1
95
0
19
44
–1
94
8
19
43
–1
94
7
19
42
–1
94
6
19
41
–1
94
5
19
36
–1
94
0
19
32
–1
93
6
19
30
–1
93
4
19
25
–1
92
9
19
20
–1
92
4
19
15
–1
91
9
19
10
–1
91
4
19
05
–1
90
9
19
00
–1
90
4
United States Italy
Demographic Research: Volume 37, Article 20
http://www.demographic-research.org 651
between 2007 and 2010 (and 2004 and 2007), and this seems to be especially evident at
older ages, namely for permanent childlessness measured at 42–44 years old (Figure 2).
These descriptive results seem to indicate that Italian women, who happened to be
childless in their late thirties during the crisis, accelerated their first birth compared to
women of the same age just before the recession. The problem with these descriptive
speculations is that we cannot differentiate between the cohort and period effect in
childlessness. To identify that, we turn to the results of the difference-in-difference
regression in next paragraph.
5.2 Difference-in-difference regression results
The results presented here use figures that report the coefficients of multivariate
regression. Complete tables are reported in the Appendix.
Figure 4 shows the difference-in-difference estimates of a linear probability model
of the total period effect of the Great Recession, net of cohort effects, on the probability
that women in the Italian sample remain childless.21 The figure presents the results in
different age groups and reports the placebo difference-in-difference estimates of the
difference in childlessness between cohorts who did not go through the crisis.
The results of the multivariate regression are in line with the descriptive results
illustrated above. They show that, in all age groups considered, there was an increase in
childlessness, net of cohort effects, in the years before the crisis. However, after 2010,
the proportion of Italian women remaining without children until their late thirties and
early forties declined. Both this decline and the previous increase are quite small,
reaching just a +2% in the placebo group of women 37–39 in 2010 versus women of the
same age in 2007, and a –1% for women in the early 40s in 2013 versus women of the
same age in 2010.22 In magnitude, these estimates are close to those obtained for the
United States (Comolli and Bernardi 2015). The 2% increase in childlessness between
2007 and 2010 (1% decline between 2010 and 2013) among women age 37‒39
represents the fluctuation in childlessness due to period effect only, isolated from the
cohort trends. In other words, net of the long-term increasing trend in cohort
childlessness, we identified a feeble acceleration of this trend due to period conditions
21 See Table A-1 in Appendix.
22 Notice, however, that these estimates cannot be considered as pure causal estimates of the effect of the
recession on childlessness between the control group and the treatment group because we did not find a zero
placebo effect. For the causal effect to be correctly identified, there should be no effect of the treatment in
absence of the treatment, namely no period effect beyond the cohort effect between the control and the
placebo group. We attribute these findings to the very strong and persistent cohort trend of increasing
childlessness illustrated in Figure 3 that overcomes any period fluctuations, even those due to the Great
Recession.
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that favored childlessness in 2007–2010 and a weak slowdown in the trend due to
period conditions buffering childlessness in 2010–2013.
Our interpretation of this result is that, in light of the continuous and steep increase
in cohort childlessness rates in Italy among women around and over 40 years old
(Figure 3), any period effect represents only a short-term fluctuation, limited in
intensity, within a context of a long-term strong rise in childlessness, the Great
Recession being no exception.
Figure 4: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the crisis on
childlessness (versus placebo estimates)
Source: Data of Table A-1 in Appendix. Elaboration of the authors based on the Italian Labor Force Survey (LFS) data 2004–2013
accessed through the Laboratorio per l’Analisi dei Dati ELEmentari (ADELE) of Istat in Florence.
However, these general results might be averaging out any heterogeneous effect of
the crisis on childlessness on specific groups of Italian women. To investigate this,
Figure 5 reports the estimates of the period effect of the crisis on childlessness by
geographic division (northwest, northeast, center, south, islands). 23  Here, the only
increase in the probability of women being childless is registered in two regions: the
23  For simplicity, the placebo difference-in-difference estimates are not reported. See Table A-2 in the
Appendix for complete regression coefficients.
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center region for women around 40 (+6% among women 38–40 years old and +2%
among women 42–44 years old), and in the islands (Sicily and Sardinia) for women 42–
44 years old (+2%). We also register an increase in the probability of childlessness
among women in the age range 37–39 living in the northwest of Italy. As before, we
can interpret this as a slightly larger tendency among women around and over 40 to
postpone first births during the crisis (2010–2013) in the center and in Sicily and
Sardinia (acceleration in the increasing trend in childlessness), compared to the northern
regions, however, no clear pattern emerges from the geographical divisions.
Figure 5: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the crisis on
childlessness by Italian geographic divisions
Source: Data of Table A-2 in Appendix. Elaboration of the authors based on the Italian Labor Force Survey (LFS) data 2004–2013
accessed through the Laboratorio per l’Analisi dei Dati ELEmentari (ADELE) of Istat in Florence.
Figure 6 instead reports the estimates across women’s educational levels (primary;
lower secondary; upper secondary; university diploma and university degree).24
24 See Table A-3 in Appendix.
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Here the trend is clearer: On average, in all age groups considered, among women
with either very low (primary) or very high (university degree) education, the
probability of remaining childless during the years of the crisis declined in comparison
to their cohort trend, while this probability increased among women with mid
education. The latter increase in childlessness is at the maximum among women with a
university diploma in the age range of 38–40 years old (+8%) and 42–44 years old
(more than +3%). On top of the long-term increase, we register a clear acceleration in
childlessness rates during the Great Recession only among mid-educated Italian
women. No other educational group displays any tendency in postponing childbearing
beyond the long-term cohort effect already in place before the crisis.
Figure 6: Difference-in-difference estimates by women’s educational level
Source: Data of Table A-3 in Appendix. Elaboration of the authors based on the Italian Labor Force Survey (LFS) data 2004–2013
accessed through the Laboratorio per l’Analisi dei Dati ELEmentari (ADELE) of Istat in Florence.
6. Discussion
Most of the studies on how business cycles affect fertility argue that fertility responds
to recessions with a temporary postponement of births, concentrated on the first child
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and among the younger strata of the population. However, a recent paper by Comolli
and Bernardi (2015) finds a permanent negative effect, even if limited in magnitude, of
the Great Recession in the United States on childless white women in their late thirties.
In light of these results, in this paper we test whether a similar effect can be found in a
very different context, i.e., Italy.
The  innovation  of  this  study  is  that  we  focus  on  Italy,  a  country  where
childlessness is a recent phenomenon, but also characterized by persistent low fertility,
and  severely  hit  by  the  economic  downturn  due  to  the  2008  crisis.  In  particular,  we
estimate whether there is an effect of the crisis on permanent childlessness. To do that,
we apply a difference-in-difference method to synthetic cohorts of Italian childless
women in their late thirties and early forties to assess whether the crisis had a
permanent impact on childlessness rates (lost births). Presumably, in fact, these women
who are close to the end of their reproductive lives will not have another chance to
become mothers afterward. We use the large samples of 2004–2013 Italian Labor Force
Survey (LFS) by Istat to compare cohorts’ childlessness rates across phases of the Great
Recession.
Another  contribution  of  this  paper  is  that  we further  disentangle  the  effect  of  the
crisis on childlessness across macro-regions of residence of Italian women and across
detailed educational levels. This allows us to speculate on the mechanisms that could
explain our findings.
The descriptive results show a steeper decline in the proportion of women without
children between 2010 and 2013 compared to the decline between 2007 and 2010 (and
2004 and 2007), and this seems to be especially evident at older ages, namely for
permanent childlessness measured at 42–44 years old. This result indicates that Italian
childless women, who happened to be in their late thirties during the crisis, accelerated
having their first child compared to women of the same age just before the recession.
This is in contrast with the results obtained regarding American women.
The results of the difference-in-difference regression are in line with the
descriptive results. In all age-ranges considered, while childlessness increased in the
years before the crisis, after 2010 the proportion of Italian women remaining without
children until their late thirties and early forties declined. Notice that what we are
measuring in this model is the eventual exceptional acceleration of childlessness among
older women due to the crisis (measured as a period effect). Our findings show that the
exceptional spike found in the United States (Comolli and Bernardi 2015) did not take
place in Italy.
We argue that the main explanation for this divergent result lies in the different
long-term trends in cohort childlessness in the two countries (illustrated in Figure 3):
fairly stable in the United States, significantly increasing in Italy. Our conclusion is that
the strong and steep increase in cohort permanent childlessness rates among Italian
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women in the last decade absorbs any period effect, including the consequences of the
Great Recession.25
If we look at the heterogeneous effect of the crisis on childlessness across separate
groups of Italian women, we find no clear geographical pattern in childlessness during
the crisis. Except for the center and the islands (Sicily and Sardinia), in most of the
regions considered, during the crisis we find a decline in childlessness. As mentioned in
Section 3, childlessness has traditionally been higher in the south compared to the
center and the north of Italy, but in the latter regions it has recently started to increase
(Tanturri and Mencarini 2008). Previous empirical evidence also shows that the largest
decline in first births has been registered in the northern Italian regions. Our results tend
to indicate that, due to the crisis, permanent childlessness (among women over 40 years
old) might rise in the center and the islands,26 while in the north the postponement of
first births might still be recuperated after the crisis (where a slight increase in
childlessness is registered among only women aged 37–39 – women who potentially
could, even if not easily, recover their first birth).
We also estimate the effect of the crisis on childlessness across detailed
educational  levels,  showing  that  women  with  either  very  low  (primary)  or  very  high
(university degree) education tend to accelerate their entrance into motherhood,
notwithstanding the crisis. The uncertainty generated by the Great Recession in Italy
increased childlessness rates only among older women with average education (upper
secondary and university diploma).
Both the very low and very highly educated childless women are strongly selected
groups. The latter are women who postpone childbearing as long as they can attend
tertiary education and pursue a rewarding career in the labor market. Highly educated
women who have children in their late thirties to early forties during the crisis might
represent women who intended to have children but postponed it as long as possible.
The latter have been touched less by the economic insecurity generated by the
recession 27  and they might also be more capable of anticipating their declining
probability of conceiving at older ages, therefore they have both the financial and social
capital resources to avoid modifying their reproductive intentions, having their first
child even during the crisis, if they want.
This argument also explains why the only increasing effect of the crisis on
childlessness is found among women with middle education. These women are the ones
who, in the middle of the education and income distribution, are more likely to be
influenced in their family-formation and childbearing decisions by the financial
25 This is also the reason why we do not find a zero placebo effect.
26 This result is consistent with what has been hypothesized among the consequences of the economic crisis
for southern Italy (Svimez 2015).
27 The results of a recent Istat survey show that men and women who hold a degree were less involved in the
unemployment spike consequent to the economic crisis (De Rose and Strozza 2015).
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constraints generated by the crisis, such as an unemployed partner, an underqualified
employment, or an involuntary part-time job.
Primary educated women, instead, have no education at all or with primary school
only, which means that they are likely to be very disadvantaged.28 These women arrive
childless at the age of 35, notwithstanding their larger probability of adhering to the
social norm of motherhood.
Answering the question of why these women suddenly have their first child during
the crisis would require another study. However, if we want to speculate on what could
lead to this surge of births among disadvantaged women during exceptionally uncertain
conditions, we might point to a strategy to reduce uncertainty (Friedman, Hechter, and
Kanazawa 1994). Given that their personal, financial, and employment conditions are
already very arduous, these women might react to the even greater insecure situation by
reverting to their role of housekeepers and mothers. Edin and Kefalas (2011), in their
study of the childbearing behavior of very disadvantaged women in the United States,
describe a similar behavior. Since they realize that the end of their reproductive life is
approaching and that they will never find fulfillment in the labor market, they might be
willing to accept a relatively unsatisfying partner, only to form a family and become
mothers, and thus realize themselves.
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Appendix
Table A-1: Weighted linear probability model of the period effect of the Great
Recession on the probability of childlessness
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.058***
(–0.0582 –
–0.579)
–0.076***
(–0.076 –
–0.0761)
–0.042***
(–0.0420 –
–0.0416)
–0.052***
(–0.0522 –
–0.0519)
–0.011***
(–0.011 –
–0.0108)
–0.012***
(–0.0118 –
–0.0116)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–
1976)
0.013***
(0.0127 –
0.0130)
0.026***
(0.0257 –
0.0260)
0.013***
(0.0128 –
0.013)
0.030***
(0.0297 –
0.0300)
0.026***
(0.0255 –
0.0258)
0.019***
(0.0185 –
0.0187)
ΔΔ
(Post*Treat)
–0.007***
(–0.0075 –
–0.0070)
0.018***
(0.0180 –
0.0184)
–0.010***
(–0.010 –
–0.0099)
0.010***
(0.0101 –
0.0105)
–0.0106***
(–0.0108 –
–0.0104)
0.0008***
(0.0005 –
0.001)
Constant 0.353***(0.352 – 0.353)
0.327***
(0.03265 –
0.0327)
0.321***
(0.3203 –
0.3206)
0.291***
(0.2905 –
0.2907)
0.234***
(0.2341 –
0.2343)
0.216***
(0.216 –
0.0216)
N 47,653 54,839 49,341 56,117 54,420 61,032
Source: Elaboration of the authors based on the Italian Labor Force Survey (LFS) data 2004–2014 accessed through the Laboratorio
per l’Analisi dei Dati ELEmentari (ADELE) of Istat in Florence.
Note: * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Table A-2: Weighted linear probability model of the period effect of the Great
Recession on the probability of childlessness across Italian
geographic divisions
Northwest
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.076***
(–0.0759 –
–0.0752)
–0.087***
(–0.0875 –
–0.0868)
–0.048***
(–0.0481 –
–0.0474)
–0.063***
(–0.063 –
–0.063)
0.006***
(0.006 – 0.007)
–0.025***
(–0.025 –
–0.0246)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
–0.029***
(–0.0294 –
–0.0288)
0.023***
(0.0231 –
0.0237)
0.0014***
(0.0011 –
0.0017)
0.016***
(0.015 –
0.016)
0.014***
(0.0141 –
0.0146)
0.012***
(0.011 –
0.0118)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
0.024***
(0.0235 –
0.0245)
0.012***
(0.0111 –
0.0120)
–0.003***
(–0.0035 –
–0.0026)
0.015***
(0.0148 –
0.0158)
–0.019***
(–0.019 –
–0.018)
0.031***
(0.0309 –
0.0317)
Constant
0.40***
(0.4006 –
0.0401)
0.377***
(0.377 –
–0.376)
0.355***
(0.354 –
0.355)
0.339***
(0.338 –
0.339)
0.266***
(0.266 –
0.267)
0.255***
(0.255 –
0.255)
N 12,886 14,899 13,258 15,182 14,745 16,518
Northeast
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.063***
(–0.064 –
–0.0629)
–0.117***
(–0.117 –
–0.116)
–0.039***
(–0.039 –
–0.038)
–0.076***
(–0.077 –
–0.076)
–0.005***
(–0.006 –
–0.005)
–0.013***
(–0.014 –
–0.013)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
0.027***
(0.0268 –
0.0276)
0.0031***
(0.003 –
0.004)
0.014***
(0.0132 –
0.0140)
0.028***
(0.027 –
0.028)
0.035***
(0.035 –
0.036)
0.012***
(0.012 –
0.013)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
–0.005***
(–0.005 –
–0.004)
0.053***
(0.053 –
0.054)
–0.007***
(–0.007 –
–0.006)
0.038***
(0.037 –
0.038)
–0.031***
(–0.032 –
–0.031)
0.008***
(0.008 –
0.0085)
Constant
0.372***
(0.3718 –
0.372)
0.370***
(0.369 –
0.369)
0.346***
(0.345 –
0.346)
0.318***
(0.318 –
0.318)
0.260***
(0.259 –
0.260)
0.247***
(0.247 –
0.248)
N 9,254 10,507 9,648 10,880 10,733 11,891
Center
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.071***
(–0.072 –
–0.071)
–0.080***
(–0.081 –
0.080)
–0.095***
(–0.096 –
–0.095)
–0.054***
(–0.054 –
–0.053)
–0.035***
(–0.035 –
–0.034)
–0.012***
(–0.012 –
–0.0115)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
0.014***
(0.014 –
0.015)
0.047***
(0.046 –
0.047)
–0.038***
(–0.038 –
–0.038)
0.072***
(0.0716 –
0.0723)
0.017***
(0.016 –
0.017)
0.029***
(0.0290 –
0.0297)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
–0.019***
(–0.0198 –
–0.0187)
0.009***
(0.008 –
0.009)
0.060***
(0.060 –
0.061)
–0.042***
(–0.042 –
–0.041)
0.021***
(0.020 –
0.021)
–0.023***
(–0.023 –
–0.022)
Constant
0.387***
(0.387 –
0.388)
0.341***
(0.340 –
0.341)
0.378***
(0.377 –
0.378)
0.306***
(0.305 –
0.306)
0.257***
(0.257 –
0.257)
0.228***
(0.227 –
0.228)
N 7,598 8,177 7,788 8,328 8,494 9,207
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Table A-2: (Continued)
South
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.049***
(–0.049 –
–0.0485)
–0.049***
(–0.049 –
–0.049)
0.003***
(0.003 –
0.004)
–0.047***
(–0.047 –
–0.047)
–0.004***
(–0.004 –
–0.0036)
0.009***
(0.008 –
0.009)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
0.043***
(0.043 –
0.043)
0.0309***
(0.0306 –
0.031)
0.066***
(0.0658 –
0.0665)
0.009***
(0.009 –
0.010)
0.059***
(0.0592 –
0.060)
0.007***
(0.006 –
0.007)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
–0.019***
(–0.019 –
–0.018)
0.0003
(–0.0002 –
0.0008)
–0.0655***
(–0.066 –
–0.065)
0.050***
(0.0498 –
0.0507)
–0.031***
(–0.0311 –
–0.0303)
–0.012**
(–0.013 –
–0.012)
Constant
0.278***
(0.277 –
0.278)
0.247***
(0.246 –
0.247)
0.231***
(0.2305 –
0.231)
0.221***
(0.221 –
0.222)
0.157***
(0.157 –
0.157)
0.150***
(0.150 –
0.151)
N 10,846 12,620 11,256 12,929 12,133 13,879
Islands
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.009***
(–0.009 –
0.008)
–0.040***
(–0.040 –
–0.039)
–0.039***
(–0.040 –
–0.039)
–0.007***
(–0.008 –
–0.007)
–0.028***
(–0.028 –
–0.027)
–0.008***
(–0.009 –
–0.008)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
0.0244***
(0.024 –
0.025)
0.010***
(0.010 –
0.011)
0.021***
(0.021 –
0.022)
0.023***
(0.022 –
0.023)
–0.016***
(–0.017 –
–0.016)
0.048***
(0.048 –
0.049)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
–0.037***
(–0.038 –
–0.036)
0.031***
(0.030 –
0.032)
–0.042***
(–0.043 –
–0.042)
–0.032***
(–0.033 –
–0.031)
0.022***
(0.022 –
0.023)
–0.019***
(–0.020 –
–0.019)
Constant
0.291***
(0.291 –
0.291)
0.281***
(0.280 –
0.281)
0.277***
(0.276 –
0.277)
0.254***
(0.253 –
0.254)
0.223***
(0.222 –
0.223)
0.174***
(0.174 –
0.175)
N 5,050 6,012  5,218 6,058 5,833 6,650
Source: Elaboration of the authors based on the Italian Labor Force Survey (LFS) data 2004–2014 accessed through the Laboratorio
per l’Analisi dei Dati ELEmentari (ADELE) of Istat in Florence.
Note: * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Table A-3: Weighted linear probability model of the period effect of the Great
Recession on the probability of childlessness across women’s
educational level
Primary
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.039***
(–0.040 –
–0.038)
0.051***
(0.050 –
–0.052)
0.017***
(0.016 –
0.018)
–0.037***
(–0.038 –
–0.037)
0.017***
(0.017 –
0.018)
–0.003***
(–0.003 –
–0.002)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
0.040***
(0.039 –
0.040)
0.087***
(0.086 –
0.087)
0.061***
(0.06 –
0.061)
–0.014***
(–0.015 –
–0.013)
0.042***
(0.041 –
0.043)
0.0007**
(0.0001 –
0.001)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
–0.019***
(–0.021 –
–0.018)
–0.090***
(–0.091 –
–0.089)
–0.034***
(–0.036 –
0.033)
0.054***
(0.053 –
0.055)
–0.027***
(–0.028 –
–0.026)
0.020***
(0.019 –
0.021)
Constant
0.282***
(0.282 –
0.283)
0.196***
(0.195 –
0.196)
0.22***
(0.219 –
0.220)
0.234***
(0.233 –
0.234)
0.171***
(0.0171 –
0.172)
0.171**
(0.170 –
0.171)
N 1,396 2,234 1,569 2,488 2,432 3,592
Lower secondary
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.029***
(–0.029 –
–0.028)
–0.047***
(–0.047 –
–0.047)
–0.012***
(–0.012 –
–0.011)
–0.038***
(–0.038 –
–0.037)
–0.005***
(–0.006 –
–0.005)
–0.004***
(–0.004 –
–0.004)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
–0.0001
(–0.0004 –
0.0001)
0.016***
(0.016 –
0.017)
0.004***
(0.0035 –
0.0041)
0.018***
(0.017 –
0.018)
0.034***
(0.034 –
0.035)
0.019***
(0.019 –
0.019)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
0.024***
(0.023 –
0.024)
0.019***
(0.018 –
0.019)
0.007***
(0.007 –
0.008)
0.026***
(0.0257 –
0.0263)
–0.025***
(–0.025 –
0.025)
–0.0013***
(–0.0016 –
–0.0096)
Constant
0.274***
(0.274 –
0.275)
0.258***
(0.258 –
0.258)
0.257***
(0.257 –
0.257)
0.240***
(0.239 –
0.240)
0.198***
(0.198 –
0.198)
0.179***
(0.179 –
0.179)
N 16,916 22,038 18,364 23,466 23,442 28,038
Upper secondary
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.062***
(–0.062 –
–0.061)
–0.098***
(–0.098 –
–0.097)
–0.058***
(–0.058 –
–0.057)
–0.055***
(–0.055 –
–0.054)
–0.015***
(–0.015 –
–0.015)
–0.019***
(–0.019 –
–0.0187)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
0.001***
(0.001 –
0.002)
0.012***
(0.012 –
0.012)
–0.003***
(–0.004 –
–0.003)
0.034***
(0.034 –
0.034)
0.007***
(0.006 –
0.007)
0.020***
(0.0198 –
0.020)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
–0.022***
(–0.022 –
–0.022)
0.036***
(0.036 –
0.037)
–0.015***
(–0.016 –
–0.015)
–0.003***
(–0.003 –
–0.0025)
0.020***
(0.020 –
0.021)
0.004***
(0.0038 –
0.0046)
Constant
0.367***
(0.367 –
0.367)
0.355***
(0.355 –
0.355)
0.338***
(0.338 –
0.338)
0.304***
(0.304 –
0.3045)
0.253***
(0.253 –
0.253)
0.233***
(0.233 –
0.233)
N 18,443 19,814 18,503 19,725 19,095 20,535
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Table A-3: (Continued)
University diploma
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.001**
(–0.002 –
–0.0003)
–0.173***
(–0.174 –
–0.172)
–0.077***
(–0.078 –
–0.076)
–0.121***
(–0.122 –
–0.119)
–0.05***
(–0.052 –
–0.050)
0.023***
(0.022 –
0.024)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
0.033***
(0.032 –
0.034)
–0.105***
(–0.106 –
–0.104)
0.008***
(0.007 –
0.009)
–0.021***
(–0.022 –
–0.020)
–0.009***
(–0.10 –
–0.008)
–0.005***
(–0.006 –
–0.05)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
0.004***
(0.002 –
0.005)
0.172***
(0.171 –
0.173)
0.080***
(0.078 –
0.082)
0.044***
(0.0425 –
0.0455)
0.034***
(0.032 –
0.035)
–0.075***
(–0.076 –
–0.073)
Constant
0.361***
(0.361 –
0.362)
0.466***
(0.465 –
0.467)
0.367***
(0.366 –
0.367)
0.388***
(0.388 –
0.389)
0.283***
(0.282 –
0.284)
0.287***
(0.287 –
0.288)
N 1,306 1,597 1,344 1,531 1,283 1,359
University degree
37–39 38–40 42–44
ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ ΔΔ Placebo ΔΔ
Post
(e.g., 37–39)
–0.126***
(–0.0129 –
–0.125)
–0.142***
(–0.143 –
–0.142)
–0.090***
(–0.090 –
–0.089)
–0.092***
(–0.09 –
–0.091)
–0.024***
(–0.024 –
–0.023)
–0.048***
(–0.049 –
–0.048)
Treat
(e.g., 1974–1976)
0.014***
(0.014 –
0.015)
0.022***
(0.011 –
0.012)
0.033***
(0.033 –
0.034)
0.003***
(0.003 –
0.004)
0.005***
(0.005 –
0.006)
–0.006***
(–0.007 –
–0.006)
ΔΔ (Post*Treat)
–0.005***
(–0.006 –
–0.005)
0.017***
(0.016 –
0.017)
–0.022***
(–0.022 –
–0.021)
0.002***
(0.0015 –
0.003)
–0.028***
(–0.029 –
–0.028)
0.024***
(0.023 –
0.025)
Constant
0.492***
(0.491 –
0.492)
0.480***
(0.480 –
0.481)
0.433***
(0.433 –
0.433)
0.430***
(0.430 –
0.430)
0.332***
(0.331 –
0.332)
0.338***
(0.337 –
0.338)
N 8,676 8,196 8,620 7,920 7,366 6,573
Source: Elaboration of the authors based on the Italian Labor Force Survey (LFS) data 2004–2014 accessed through the Laboratorio
per l’Analisi dei Dati ELEmentari (ADELE) of Istat in Florence.
Note: * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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